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PROHIBITION AND THE KANSAS 
PROGRESSIVE EXAMPLE 
PATRICK G. O'BRIEN 
Wets and drys freely exchanged epithets as 
Kansas began the twentieth century. They 
agreed only upon the fact of mass violations of 
prohibition. Kansas was dry in law and had 
local option in reality; and cities like Wichita, 
Kansas City, and Leavenworth had open 
saloons that conducted business on main 
streets in full public view. Kansas had a vast 
amount of "wet" territory, but estimates varied 
on exactly how much. One report of the 
Kansas Temperance Union stated that two-
thirds of the 129 cities and towns surveyed in 
1900 ignored prohibition laws.! 
This situation created a "New Kansas 
Crusade" to resolve the contradiction of 
widespread wetness in an officially dry state. 
The crusade turned militant as Carry A. 
Nation and her saloon "hatchetations" riveted 
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the country's attention on the state. Of greater 
consequence than "hatchetations," which 
closed few saloons permanently and made the 
perpetrators as lawless as the jointists, was the 
renewed and assiduous political activity of 
drys. They concentrated on the election of 
local officials committed to prohibition en-
forcement, and could cite successes early in the 
twentieth century. Salina, for example, elected 
an enforcement mayor and changed its munic-, 
ipal ordinances. Doing so, drys claimed, would 
lower taxes, increase community Improve-
ments , and help business. 
PROf !!BIT!O!\ AND PRe )(JPfSSIVISM 
Dry gain:; at the polls also reflected the fact 
that prohibition was part of Kansas progressive 
reform. Although historiam have tended to 
regard the two as sep:lrdtc, the\' were philo-
sophically compatihle and l,ulitic;dly fused in 
Kansas. That fusion resulted III ;1 sliccession of 
dry and reform governors from l'l(l') to I C) j lJ 
who left a progressive impf!l!t. "11 ,Ie] ell 
expansive programs of great Cl bus!llcSS 
tion, stronger COllsurner pro«'l't iOIl, lIKrc,lscd 
labor benefits and rights, electoral and; 'arTY 
reform, and fairer taxes. 
22l' l~I\E!\T 1'L:\l0:S ()L'AR.TERLY. F:\LL 19S, 
The po,; it io n of t hcsl' go\-ernor:; o n prohibi-
t io n was based on the progrcssi\'e model o f 
society, Curbin g explo itatio n, promoting pub-
lic and perso n al vi rt ue, and supp ressi ng threats 
to the public \\'elfare , all goals of t he proh ib i-
tio n is ts, \\'(' re com i, tem wit h rrogress ive ideol-
ogv . T he governors perccived no d ifference 
between regul at ing greedy bus iness men and 
eradicating boo tleggers-bot h enda nge red t he 
public. Pro h ib ition \\'as be neficia l to Kansas , in 
the judgment of the gover no rs, and that was 
the o nl y Justi fica tion they th o ught necessary. 
T ypi ca l was Gcwernor Edward H och's cl aim 
thar "proh ibi tion in Kan sas is a great success . I 
do not be lieve there are 1,600,000 peop le 
aI1\'\\'here on earth freer fro m the ev ils o f 
inte mperance and other \'ices, and who at the 
same time are more prosperous and h appy . " , 
The progressive governo rs used un prece-
de nted state autho rity to exc ise the liquo r 
traffic , an d each \I'as confident th at Kansas 
could be wrung d ry. Their co nfide nce was no t 
to tall v base less. A large portio n of t he Kansas 
popu latio n of nat i\'e stock and Pro testant fa ith 
favored prohibition . The fusio n of proh ibit io n 
and progress ivism had made the d ry posi tio n 
poli tica ll y in\'ldnerable, Wets h ad never been 
as st ro ng and uni ted as drys , and th ey lost 
representation when t he D emocrat ic Pan y 
disca rded its h abi tua l anti-prohib ition declara-
tion in 1904. Wi th a dry m andate and sh at-
tered \Iet oppos it io n, t he gover no rs could 
pursue their object ive of an abso lutely d ry 
Kansas with impu nit y, Thev learned , h O\I'e\'er , 
that t he \ITt ' \\-ere obdur3te and res ili en t. 
This Brucie surveys th e efforts of the 
progressive gO\'erno rs agail15t the li qu o r traffic 
and emphasi:es that their success \I'as qua lified 
and en tailed violation of progressive max ims . 
T he \'1olation in lmge part resu lted from the 
untenab le pc)sitlon into \\'hi ch the gover no rs 
helped put rhcm::eln:s . Bv adopting extreme 
l'nforcemenr policies and encouraging unrea lis-
tic dr y expel~tarions, they cou ld not adm it 
£allure widwut repudiat ing their lHln cO I1\'ic-
ti()l1S ;Jll d in\' iting dr\' repri ' als. This dilemma 
induced t he govern o rs to exaggerate the suc-
ce55 of their po lieit';: and to port ray Kansas as a 
model dry state, whi ch infl ated the prohib i-
tionist sentiment th at culminated in the Eigh -
teenth Amendment. 
Lack of cando r was no t the governo rs' o nly 
divergence from progressive ideals. A lthough 
ideologicall y agai n st p ri vate influence in gov-
ernment, they h ad few qualms about dry 
arrogati on of power. Prohibitio nist o rganiza-
tio ns fo rmed a nearly sy mb io tic union with 
progressive admini stratio ns, which virtually 
gave them offi cial status. The prohibitio nists' 
u nrestri cted access to the governors and the 
fac t that dry groups had authority com pa rable 
to that of government raises serious questio ns 
o f propri ety. 
A preoccupatio n with enforcement divert-
ed the state from significant problem s and led 
to excesses . Laws fo r enfo rcing prohibitio n 
often invested public o fficers with exceptional 
powers and provided them addition al co mpen-
satio n. This combination encouraged excesses 
of authority and induced offi cers to neglect 
enforcement of sign ificant laws that did no t 
carry a pecuniary reward. The extent o f official 
m alfeasance cannot be stated exactly , but 
charges were widespread. Some drys , as well as 
wets, labeled enfo rcement as a perfectly lega l 
racket , though it contributed to official expe-
diency and pub lic cy nicism. The governors 
sanctioned the system of enfo rcem ent and 
supported laws th at both entren ch ed it and 
clashed with citizens' rights. Instructive is the 
191 7 testimo ny of the Kan sas atto rney general 
supporting a law to m ake possession of intoxi-
cating beverages a crime. S . M. Brewster 
admitted that the proposed law would m ake 
" lawbreakers out of men wh o don 't abuse the 
keepink [sic] o f liquo r, " but explained it was 
n ecessa ry to attain absolute enfo rcement." 
Although the laws were in theo ry to apply 
u niforml y to all Kansa n s, in practice they fe ll 
heavily o n certain ethnic grou ps . Some offi-
cials in locati on s with large foreign co ncentra-
tio ns, like southeast Kan sas, occasion ally tried 
to ex plain the fru stratio n of enforcement to 
the governors . A few eve n stated th at the 
bootleggers wh o explo ited t he ignoran ce of the 
immigrants were the biggest problem. Progres-
sive governors, having little patience with the 
reasons why immigrants defied prohihition, 
preferred drastic enforcement measures t( 1 
education. Public attitudes enabled governors 
to take actions against the immigrants that 
would have heen unthinkahle tow;lrd other 
groups, hut those actions evoked litt Ie puhlic 
outrage and slight sympathy for the victims. 
Prohihition 111 Kansas was definitely ;1 
progressive reform, but it went ;lwry in some 
important respects. Its hlueprint was hased on 
a laudahle vision for society that failed when 
translated to an imperfect world. This was 
apparent in the enforcement convulsions of 
the progressive Kansas administrations frorn 
1905 to 19I 1). 
Progressive Republican, editor of the Mmi 
on Record, ;md staunch prohibitionist, Gover-
nor Edward Hoch began his first adminis-
tration in 1905 with a vow to cooperate "to the 
full extent of official power" with the Kans;ls 
Temperance Union. 11e invoked t he responsi-
bility of his office, not personal predilection, as 
his reason to enforce prohihition. An end to 
prohibition violations was not "a quest ion of 
temperance or even morality," according to 
him, hut "simply a question of law enforce-
ment." Although Hoch once conceded "there 
may be a question as to majority ... senti-
ment in favor of prohibition," he was certain 
of "the rnajority in favor of law enforcement." 
As governor, therefore, he was only respond-
ing to the people of Kansas, who "demand the 
enforcement of the law whether they arc 
prohibitionists or not."" Hoch's attempt to 
separate enforcement frOln the prohihition 
issue itself in order to avoid emotional dehate 
and political repercussions was hoth transpa-
rent and unsuccessful. 
In a departure from the policies of previous 
governors, Hoch denounced saloon licensing 
and warned local officials of the consequences 
if they failed to enforce the law. His promise to 
squeeze Kansas dry and his firm statement on 
enforcement earned hirn the accolades of drys. 
mUllIBITll)N ANI) I'I{()( ;IZESSIVFS 
FIG. 1. GOVl'mOT Edward Hoch. Courtesy K:111S:1S 
St:1te Historic:11 Society, TopeL!. 
It W;lS one thing to pn)(\;lim t h;lt K;lIIS;lS 
would stamp out the liquor tr:llk, hUI II(Kh 
quickly learned it was another to do so. fie 
gravely 1I1llkrcslimated till' s(,dl' ()f vi()hti')ll'" 
He considered the prohihitory I:l\\' "Llirlv w(,l! 
enforced" in 1')0 pencllt o! till' j()') K;111'.;I:, 
counties, hased Up011 his :,urvcy (,: «HiIJt\ 
officials. A leading !H'\VSpapcr g(l! I1HilC' )'(' ; ill'; 
tic results frOln its ClJlV;lSS of I~ I count ics, 
finding only 23 where offici:d:-:: genuinely tried 
to enforce the bw. Eighteen were (lIK'llly wet) 
with 41')0 "Iiccnsed" s;do()lIs :llHI ;111 lJl1Vl'rJfinl 
number of liquor joints. 
Public officials could he ex hurt cd t () do 
their duty, hut governors h;ld limit cd lIll'ans III 
compel them. f loch first tried persll:lsion wit h 
a letter to every sheriff :llld (Hlllty ;l((orllcy 
urging the enforcement ()f the Ll\\,. I\('~;ults 
were mixed, and Ho(h ( l[Hludcd t h:lt (1)(' 
letters "resulted in IlHllh guud in the srn:dln 
towns and counties, hUI Ihl'v h;ld lIllie dln I ill 
the brger citieo." GO\'ernor Hoch could 
appoint assistilnt attorne"s general with exten-
sive authority to cIlfcm:e pmhibition in thL' 
counties. During hi" fir"t \'eilr in office he 
followed through hy "appointing attorneys in 
every CUlIntv when' we think [hey are 
needed.'" By the middle of 1006, he com-
mented on their lIne\'cn :;ueeess, and indiL'ated 
his pri\'ate skepticism when he \\Tute, "I have 
appointed. . eight or nine assistant attornev 
generals, but with few exceptions the result has 
not been very satisfactory." Obviously, the 
problems that had confronted public official" 
in many counties also stvmied those appointed 
by Hoch; and certain of the assistant attorneys 
general were accused of ineptitude and malfea-
sance, \X1hen local officials were completely 
refractory, Hoch's last resort was to initiate 
ouster proceedings. Even this extreme measure 
did not always get impressive results. 
The enforcement powers of the governors 
were limited by budget. Hoch and his succes-
sors habitually complained about the paltry 
enforcement contingency fund. Stark econ-
omy forced Hoch to concentrate his enforce-
ment efforts and resources where prohibition 
violations were flagrant and chronic: Kansas 
City, Wichita, and Crawford and Cherokee 
counties." Even the pretense of prohibition 
compliance had been abandoned in Kansas 
City, where drunkenness purportedly made 
the streets unsafe for women. The city became 
Hoch's primary enforcement target, and the 
resulting uproar attracted national attention. 
Because his imbroglio with Kansas City offi-
cials, especially the mayor, was long and hitter, 
the enforcement drive was less than a complete 
,md permanent success. William \\/. Rose, a 
Henrv George single-taxer and heliever in 
municipal ownership of utilities who had heen 
elected mayor in 1905, eschewed hypocrisy 
and used the saloons to raise revenues. Joint 
keepers regularly put up bonds that were 
forfeited to the city treasury when the jointists 
failed to appear in court. Mayor Rose was 
honest in collections and freely admitted to 
anyone that the system existed: when rebuked 
for violating the prohibitinn statutes, he 
bluntly rejoined, "Damn the law." 
A clash between Governor Hoch and 
~layor RC):ie wa, perhaps inevitable, but the 
decision to close Missouri saloons on Sundays 
precipitated it. Calling the closing a farce, Rose 
refused to follow the Missouri example. 
Thirst\" crowds surged across the state line into 
Kansas City, Kansas, saloons and the subse-
quent storm of protest led Hoch to have ouster 
suits filed against the mavor and county 
attorney. Rose, offering no defense, resigned 
two clays before the Kansas Supreme Court 
declared him ousted, but he immediately filed 
as a candidate for the office he had vacated 
and won the special election on 8 May 1906. In 
a campaign waged along wet and dry lines, he 
called prohibition a "curse" while his oppo-
nent promised to close the joints; this ensured 
Rose the opposition of the Civic League, law 
enforcers, and church folk. Rose's victory 
margin of 1,441 votes out of 12,495 may be a 
commentary on the proportion of godly and 
law-abiding citizens in Kansas City. The 
election was a rebuff of Hoch, hut it only 
marked a setback in a fight that the governor 
would soon win. When Rose resumed office, 
the Kansas attorney general instituted con-
tempt proceedings against him, and the Kan-
sas Supreme Court on 6 July 1906 fined Rose 
and ordered him to quit office. 
While Hoch enjoyed accolades from the 
drys for his action against Kansas City offi-
cials, attorney C. W. Trickett led an enforce-
ment offensive in the city. The effort was 
intense: reports of raids, arrests, and saloon 
closings were common news items. A degree of 
success in drying up Kansas City could he 
legitimately claimed, and a Southern Method-
ist Church steward wrote that, with the joint 
closings, "insted [sic} of seeing a dozen drunk-
en men pass my house I only saw one last 
Sunday."ll Some observers, however, thought 
the situation little changed, except that boot-
leggers were more furtive, saloons better con-
cealed, and customers more cautious. When 
Alabamians visited Kansas City in 1907 to 
judge its dryness, they reported that they had 
"bought and paid for five hottles of whiskey, at 
fi \ 'e loca t ions ," , 
G O\'erno r H och asserted th at the Kans as 
Cit\' campaign "broke the b ack of la \\ l e~~ne5::" 
and "made t he enforcement of the !a\\' in o ther 
cities muc h easie r." - T hat claim is no t read ilv 
subst antiated b\' his exper ience \\'i t h \\'ich it a 
a nd the southeas t Kamas cou nti es, \ \ 'ich it a 
was as we t \\'h en H och rook office as it had 
been in it s cowwwn era , and his campaign 
the re paralleled that in Kansas C it\" A gener al 
impression \\a5 th at as man\' sa loo ns \\ ere in 
business after t h e campaign as befo re , a l-
though a la rge number had probabh' closed 
temporarih' , On l\, one sa loo n was shut perma-
nently- after someon e took a ca rn iva l el-
eph an t there and got it drunk, enraged animal 
lovers closed t h e saloon , 
In Crawfo rd and Cherokee counties , p ro-
h ib it io n offens i\-es, wit h out exception termed 
successful, \\"Cre fo llO\\'ed b\' rene\\'ed bootleg-
ging and the reopening of saloons ; then th e 
cycle would be repeated, As in the case of 
Kansas Ci t \' and \'\' ich it a, H och cou ld show 
gai ns in terms of arrests, convict io ns, and 
sa loo n closings ; but these counties \\'ith large 
immigrant populat ions \\'ere never drv \\, hi le 
he \\'as governor. - Other portio ns of t h e st ate 
sh o wed n o ch an ge, and t h is led proh ibition ists 
\\'ho had earli er expressed unstinting praise for 
the governor to chide him , Angered, H och 
asserted , "Condi tions arc ben er toda\' 
, . , than thev have been since the law \\'as 
passed," and complained , "I am ge tting fa-
tigued with cri ticism fr o m people \\' h o ough t to 
be commen d ing me." Once eager to expand 
state respon sib ility in enfo rcement, H oc h cam e 
to belie\'e th at local att itudes were a large part 
of the problem , He concluded th at "the people 
must lear n not to sh ift the responsib il it y to 
some distant authoritv , to the G overnor or 
attorney general, but mus t gr a\' elv b ear it 
themseh"es, " , 
H och cou ld legit im ateh' declare , "1 h 2\'e 
do ne more to enforce the prohib itot\, la\\' than 
an\' gover nor of t he st ate . . . in fifteen 
vea rs. " , But h e con sistently embell ished h is 
su ccesses and hid his fa ilures and pri \-ate 
fru strations. Although the liquor traffic \\'as 
set back in his admmi;.:rrc1t ioI! , Kans d::' \\a;; sull 
\\'et when he ler't ,)fflLe. Yet H Cl:h , 
that th e 
could effuse, "\\'c afe re C1!' i n~ C1 :~e\\ ~-i \ !k a t ic' n 
here and to a Kansa s I~l dn fan:. ilu f \\ id:. these 
good th mgs it seem" lCl c~ redib le." l:-li~ e \l-
denee : 'IO f th. e 1 \.~ 5 (~()~lnti. e~ . . lJrl h.- : 1 hd\ "e 
am' paupers , Thi rt\ -fi\c ha\e their clbso-
lutel\' em pt\. Th irt\' -se\'en h2\ 'C n o ([, fmna l 
cases o n their doc ketS , Kan53s has the :sm,~ llest 
n u mber of paupefS o f an\' State in pro;Junio n 
to population. It 5pend~ more mo ne\' tor 
edu cat ion in proportio n to its 
anv o ther State, ":. 
than 
Progressive Repu l~lican \:\' alter .-\ . Stubbs, 
inaugura ted in 1909 , \\35 more ::ealods. H oc h 
h ad m ade inroads against the tr affic : 
FIG , 2. GOt emOT W·'den A, Swbbs. C ourtesy 
Ka nsas State H istorical Society, Topeka. 
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Stubbs was determined to eradicate it. The 
1909 bone-dry law, which easily passed the 
legislature and banned the sale of liquor for 
any reason, was his favorite tool. Although the 
previous law, allowing restricted sale for specif-
ic purposes, could not be enforced, drys 
maintained that the more comprehensive and 
stringent new law would make enforcement 
easier. They were only partially correct. Prohi-
bitionists could claim that stricter laws ren-
dered Kansas drier, but that claim could be 
refuted by the increased number of violations 
of the new law. This dilemma may explain the 
oscillation of the drys between deploring mass 
violation of the law and praising the dryness of 
Kansas. 
Like Hoch, Stubbs concentrated on egre-
giously wet spots, but he made Crawford and 
Cherokee counties his first priority. His 1909 
and 1910 campaigns against them made 
Hoch's pale by comparison, but it is nearly 
impossible to gauge Stubbs's success.:: Enforce-
ment varied widely according to location and 
time; it was not unusual to have a location 
certified dry one week and reported wet the 
next. The saloons in many of the mining 
camps and small towns never closed. Closed 
saloons often reopened, or their closing led to 
an increase in kitchen joints, clubs, and 
bootlegging. Stubbs could perhaps claim prog-
ress against the liquor traffic, but his frequent 
contention that Kansas had no open saloons 
and was drier than ever before in its history 
was dubious. Frustrated by these failures, 
Stubbs pulled out all stops to suppress the 
southeast Kansas liquor traffic. He threatened 
public officials he considered tepid on enforce-
ment or in collusion with violators with 
expulsion from office and carried out some of 
these threats. He used undercover agents, 
usually endorsed by the Kansas Temperance 
Union, who habitually violated the prohibi-
tion and vice laws in order to obtain evidence. 
Their written reports and itemized expense 
accounts confirm that they engaged in many 
unsavory activities to make Kansas dry and 
virtuous.!' The use of agents who were them-
selves lawbreakers raises serious doubts about 
the ethics of enforcement practices. 
Perhaps Stubbs's least conscionable act was 
a conspiracy against Italian mining camps that 
had proved refractory. An advisor suggested 
that Stubbs use an Anti-Horse Thief League to 
destroy the Italian camps, accomplishing all 
that the militia could "but without the odium 
of its being said the militia was used to enforce 
prohibition."" While the League was being 
reconstituted, conspirators in Topeka ob-
tained weapons, gathered men from the gover-
nor's office and the Kansas Temperance Union 
to assist with the mission, and "mapped out a 
line of action."" With an announcement that a 
volunteer association with the legal power to 
smash the liquor traffic had been formed, the 
Topeka men were ordered into southeast 
Kansas. When District Judge E. E. Sapp 
learned of their arrival and threatened to have 
them arrested if they proceeded with the plot, 
the men returned to Topeka. Governor 
Stubbs openly proclaimed that he would use 
the militia if necessary and warned he would 
end prohibition violations "even if I have to 
smash and burn the wagons that carry the beer 
and tear down the houses in which beer is 
sold." Sapp rejoined that the use of militia 
would be an "armed invasion" and he would 
personally lead citizens against it." An armed 
confrontation was avoided. 
Stubbs began his last and most ambitious 
campaign against liquor interests in southeast 
Kansas in late 1912. Again, the enforcement 
gains may have been genuine, but they were 
short-lived. On 3 January 1913 an agent in 
southeast Kansas reported "Conditions down 
here and especially in Cherokee County are 
bad."!; Predictably, Stubbs did not make this 
final report public. 
While the governor ignored violations in 
many locations, he pronounced Kansas vir-
tually dry, basing his claims upon his intense 
and publicized campaigns in selected wet cities. 
Stubbs's attempts to dry them out often had 
the same results as in Crawford and Cherokee 
counties, and he was just as unwilling to 
concede limits to his success. Progressive 
governors wanted Topeka, the capital city, to 
be a dry example, yet one of Stubbs's agents 
informed him in mid 1912 that "I find ... T 0-
peka in a very wet condition and have seen 
liquor unloaded in 25 or 30 ... joints."" Only 
ten days later, Stubbs wrote W. F. Turrentine, 
a small-town newspaper editor who had re-
ported violations in Topeka, "I do not believe 
there is a single place where liquor is sold over 
the bar. "29 To justify his claim, the governor 
ordered the Shawnee County attorney to 
eradicate any liquor traffic, and the chastened 
official explained that the "exaggerated" stories 
of violations resulted from the political malice 
of disaffected Germans. i,' 
Conditions in Wichita frustrated every 
governor and perhaps Stubbs the most. He 
told the mayor in late 1911 that the "state of 
lawlessness existing in Wichita ... is absolute-
ly intolerable. "ll Stubbs threatened officials, 
unleashed agents, and held the Kansas attor-
ney general personally liable in a campaign to 
crush the illegal Wichita liquor business. The 
first results were negligible, but progress did 
follow.]2 Drys and some local politicians later 
asserted briefly that Wichita had been drained 
of "suds" and "rotgut," but while Stubbs 
probably made it more expensive and inconve-
nient for Wichitans to drink, he could not stop 
them. In Wichita, as in many other targeted 
cities, the liquor traffic survived through 
caution, adaptiveness, and official leniency. 
When joints became less visible, many san-
guine drys reached the unwarranted conclu-
sion that the liquor traffic had been 
permanently dealt with, that customers had 
become teetotalers from necessity. Stubbs's 
self-congratulation about Wichita was inter-
rupted by a packing-house manager who told 
him that "before the town went dry, we had 
but very little drinking among our employees, 
since then, not a single day goes by but what a 
half dozen or so have to be sent home or 
permanently discharged for intoxication."li 
Dry gains could be deceptive. 
Kansas had the reputation as the temper-
ance leader of all the states. Drys everywhere 
looked to it to confirm that prohibition really 
worked, and a sense of responsibility encour-
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aged Kansas governors to describe the state in 
terms that were incongruous with wet realities. 
Governor Stubbs issued habitual assurances 
that Kansas was "the driest state in the 
union." He tried to conceal the real conditions 
and convey the sense to the country that 
prohibition was a great success. While Wichita 
was "wide open" and complaints of violations 
in Crawford and Cherokee counties flooded 
his office, Stubbs informed a California prohi-
bitionist, "There is not an open joint in the 
state today according to reports received this 
morning."" He expanded his claims when he 
answered an inquiry from Idaho with the 
statement that "every city in Kansas above 
twenty-five thousand is absolutely dry."" This 
was about the time that Stubbs's own agent 
reported that Topeka was "very wet." Stubbs 
and the rest of the governors convinced the 
nation that prohibition worked, but they 
would be largely responsible for the derision of 
Kansans when the country became disaffected 
with Prohibition in the next generation. 
GOVERNOR GEORGE H. HODGES: 1913-1915 
Democrat George H. Hodges, Stubbs's 
successor, stated unequivocally that prohibi-
tion was the "best law Kansas ever put on its 
statute books," and he promised his adminis-
tration would be a model of enforcement." 
Hodges had inviolate dry convictions, but 
zealots feared that the Democrat would be 
tepid on enforcement. Their qualms had a 
germ of validity although there is no evidence 
that he was influenced by the fact that a 
disproportionate number of violators would 
probably be Democrats. Learning perhaps 
from his predecessors, the new governor 
discarded highly publicized campaigns and 
loud rhetoric. This may have appeared passive, 
but the emphasis on quiet, grassroots enforce-
ment had few political liabilities. 
Hodges granted local officials the primary 
responsibility to enforce prohibition laws, 
since the governor believed that "local law 
enforcements are much better than a sporadic 
effort from people on the outside."" This was 
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FIG. 3. Gotemor George H. Hodges. Courtesy 
Kansas State Historical Society , Topeka. 
an unconcealed jab against Stubbs, who had 
rashly intruded into local situations, and an 
endorsement of Hoch's earlier position. 
Hodges also renounced selective campaigns 
against "soaking wet" locations and supported 
uniform state\\'ide enforcement. "\Ve do not 
expect," he explained, "to pick out any partic-
ular locality and use extraneous effort to 
enforce the laws in that localitv, while other 
portions of the state are dealt more leniently 
\\'ith. Hodges did not bother to note that 
limited resources made it impossible for the 
state assiduousk to enforce prohibition everv-
where. 
The contrast between Stubbs and Hodges 
was pronounced. The former's campaigns were 
attended bv eXpanSl\'e publicit\· while the 
latter subscribed to quiet enforcement. Hodges 
asserted that "the prohibition law is far better 
enforced ... than it has ever been and we are 
doing this without brass, bands."c Perhaps 
Stubbs had earned some accolades for aggres-
sive campaigns, but massive publicity carried 
liabilities. By eschewing inflated publicity, 
Hodges could claim great success in his en-
deavor to close down joints and drive the 
bootleggers out of the state, and his claim 
could not be easily refuted in the absence of 
contrary publicity. 
Adhering to his announced policy of local 
responsibility, Hodges ignored pleas that had 
worked with earlier governors. For instance, 
the Citizens League of Cherokee County wired 
Hodges on 1 Julv 1913: "\Ve need help a 
minister assaulted today by a mob of jointists 
and dangerously injured official."" Help was 
not forthcoming. \Vhen the League wrote 
Governor Hodges the next month about joints 
and corrupt officials, his secretary answered: 
"Quit complaining and get the evidence [to] 
accomplish some real good for the cause of law 
enforcement in 'lour county.""' Hodges ap-
peared nearly unconcerned about reports of 
violations. Information about open saloons in 
southeast Kansas provoked no great outburst 
of activity in the governor's office and neither 
did the complaint that t\\'o third-grade stu-
dents, who sold bottles in saloons, were under 
the influence of whiskey at the school> 
Hodges was not lackadaisical, however; he had 
a different strategy for suppressing the liquor 
traffic. 
Prohibition enforcement was "primarilv in 
the hands of the people," according to Hodges, 
and they could best attain it when they "elect 
men who are in svmpathy with law enforce-
ment, and if thev fail to keep their pre-election 
promises, to relegate them to private life at the 
next election." Elementary civics, widely ig-
nored bv many drys, indicated that "public 
officers will respect dominant public senti-
ment. If 'lOU have a strong sentiment for the 
enforcement of the law in your community, 
'lOU will get it enforced. If 'lOU do not have 
such a sentiment, 'lour public officers 
will ... be lax.""' Although this sounds as if 
Hodges favored a local option solution, he had 
perceived a change in public attitudes that 
entailed a change in enforcement tactics. 
Whereas Kansans earlier had been closely 
divided on prohibition, Hodges discerned that 
the dry territory was growing, as indicated by 
the election of town, city, and county officials 
on dry platforms. If the problem had once 
been to secure public compliance with prohibi-
tion, the greater problem now was to ensure 
that elected officials enforced the laws. 
Hodges, therefore, concentrated on them, and 
one of his principal enforcement policies was 
to bring ouster suits against officials deemed 
remiss in their duties. 
Soon after he assumed office, Hodges 
convinced himself that he had made Kansas 
virtually dry. When a citizen complained in 
January 1913 of widespread liquor violations in 
Cherokee County, Hodges replied, "Your part 
of the state is perhaps no worse than a great 
many other 10calities."44 By April he boasted 
that, in stemming violations, "we are succeed-
ing now as never before."" By May Kansas had 
"very little bootlegging and very few joints."" 
And finally in July he declared that there was 
"not an open saloon in the state."': Hodges 
had mentally transformed Kansas from a wet 
state to an arid one within six months. It was 
easier to declare Kansas dry and enjoy the 
benefits than to attempt to make it so and reap 
the consequences of failure. Although he was 
defeated for reelection in 1914, Hodges left 
office with a national reputation as an inveter-
ate prohibitionist and the next year became an 
Anti-Saloon League lecturer. 
GOVERNOR ARTHUR CAPPER: 1915-1919 
Republican Arthur Capper would become 
one of America's foremost prohibitionists and 
leader of the Farm Bloc while in the U.S. 
Senate. Capper congratulated the country in 
1918 on the fact that if would soon join dry 
Kansas and enjoy the same benefits. "Prohibi-
tion has been an unqualified success from 
every standpoint in Kansas," he authoritative-
ly informed the nation, and unctuously added, 
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"Our people know and appreciate the bles-
sings-material, moral, and spiritually which 
have come to them because they have not 
been cursed by the saloon and its attendant 
vices."" Yet, Capper's own papers belie his 
claims. 
Soon after the assumption of office, Gover-
nor Capper ordered investigations in Kansas 
City and Wyandotte County. As a result, 
misconduct charges were filed against the 
Kansas City election commissioner for neglect-
ing his duties while he lobbied in Topeka 
against anti-liquor legislation, and grounds 
were revealed for an ouster suit against a 
Wyandotte County commissioner. Although 
these officials were not specifically charged 
with prohibition violations, the investigation 
had revealed widespread vice and wetness. 
One operative informed the governor: "I have 
succeeded in finding out that drinking and 
gambling is in full blast in the Slav colonies, 
and, as I understand it, is being done under 
police protection. "'" Investigators visiting 
premises filed reports in the vein of "Joint at 
615 Ferry was running full blast today. Men-
women and even children were there and 
drinking keg beer. This place is running and 
has been ... for more than a year and I saw a 
policeman in full uniform in there.";" These 
confidential reports make especially interesting 
reading in the light of the intermittent asser-
tions since Hoch that Kansas City was dry. 
Indicative of the situation in Wichita was 
the arrest in 1915 of Police Chief O. K. 
Stewart for selling confiscated whiskey in city 
hall. Three wagonloads of whiskey and beer 
stored there were dumped in the Arkansas 
River several days later. A Wichita city 
commissioner informed Capper in 1916 that 
"the town has not been as open in years as it 
has been now for several months."" Kansas 
Attorney General S. M. Brewster, however, 
acceded to the pleas of the Sedgwick County 
attorney and of Henry J. Allen-prohibi-
tionist, newspaper publisher, and next gover-
nor-to avoid state intervention. i. Later 
convinced that local officials were not diligent-
ly dealing with violators, Brewster demanded 
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that the county attorney indicate why the 
state should not become involved. The county 
attorney evaded a direct answer, but admitted 
that the law was being violated, enumerated 
the obstacles to enforcement, and offered no 
hope that conditions would improve until 
local officials had greater authority, higher 
budgets, and larger staffs. " 
Habitually wet Cherokee and Crawford 
counties posed problems. The Crawford coun-
ty attorney, however, wrote Capper, "I fell [sic] 
confident that conditions are improving in our 
county ... and I also fell [sic] confident that 
conditions will continue to improve."'" The 
attorney of the adjacent county was less 
optimistic. Prohibition convictions were down, 
and he recounted problems with enforcement: 
Many of our inhabitants are foreigners who 
are accustomed to the daily use of beer and 
other intoxicants and sentiment among 
these people is naturally against the prohib-
itory law. The violation of this law usually 
occurs in residences, and it is quite difficult 
to obtain evidence necessary to secure 
convictions. Attention may also be called 
to the fact that Cherokee County is located 
in the extreme south-east corner of the state 
on the border of Missouri and Oklahoma. 
This ... adds to the difficulty of enforcing 
this law." 
Such violations embarrassed state officials in 
1916 when a Pathe Weekly News newsreel 
showed wagons loaded with beer and liquor in 
Drydale, Missouri, for delivery into Kansas 
and streams of thirsty Kansans crossing the 
line with jugs and bottles. The mockingly 
named Drydale, located just across the river 
from Leavenworth, had enough saloons to 
supply many Kansans. Offended by the news-
reel, the state censor board banned it in 
Kansas." 
The 1917 Kansas bone-dry law was de-
signed to eliminate the bulk of enforcement 
problems. Informed by Wayne B. Wheeler, 
general counsel of the Anti-Saloon League, 
that the "whole country looks to Kansas for 
leadership in prohibition laws and law enforce-
ment," the legislature passed a bill that made 
possession of alcoholic beverages a misdemean-
or. It was signed by Capper on 23 February 
1917 in the lower house chamber, "while 150 
legislators stood around the speaker's rostrum 
and sang with gusto 'No One Knows How Dry 
I Am.' "s; The national press agreed with 
Kansas drys that the law was one of the most 
drastic prohibition measures ever enacted in 
any state. 
Capper insisted that the law curbed the use 
of alcohol but Kansas still was not dry. 
Southeast Kansas continued to be a bane to 
the governor, and the missionary societies of 
the Neosho Presbytery complained in May 
1918 of flagrant violations of prohibition in 
Crawford and Cherokee counties." A growing 
bootlegging industry in the two southeastern 
counties would subsequently become a large 
supplier of illegal liquor to the rest of the 
country. The 1931 Wickersham Report on 
prohibition enforcement commented on the 
bootleggers' "fine brands of whiskey," which 
they claimed "compares well with the best 
Government or legitimate alcohol. "5' 
After passage of the 1917 bone-dry legis-
lation, Capper regarded "irresponsible" neigh-
bors, especially Missouri, as the cause of 
enforcement problems. He habitually ap-
pealed, with slight success, for the Missouri 
governor to help stop the flow of liquor into 
Kansas. Capper proposed a "sanitary zone" 
between the two Kansas Citys with no saloon 
within six hundred feet of Kansas, and pro-
tested against the Missouri saloons and distille-
ries that lured Kansas customers.'" A bitter 
exchange ensued between officials of the two 
states. Kansas authorities accused Missouri 
county officials of negligence and even culpa-
bility, and the Missouri officials issued angry 
countercharges. One conceded that "condi-
tions on the line have been bad," but rebuked 
Kansas officials for failure to give those in 
Missouri "the support they could or should." 
Charging that Kansas authorities made "no 
effort" to prevent their citizens from bringing 
liquor into their state, a second Missourian 
complained, "I am getting tired, of those 
officers in Kansas continually howling when 
... they are not in good faith, and ... in the 
Northern part of Cherokee County and in 
Crawford County, Kansas, a number of 
Greeks are running joints openly, publicly and 
on Sunday and are never arrested."'i Cooper-
ation eluded the officials of the two states, and 
there is no evidence that the entry of liquor 
into Kansas was curbed. Missouri officials may 
have been remiss in enforcement, but so were 
Kansas authorities, especially in the southeast-
ern part of the state. Capper sincerely wished 
to stop the interstate liquor traffic, but it was 
easier for him to rail against Missourians than 
to enforce compliance in Kansas. 
CONCLUSION 
Kansas prohibitionists believed that out-
side wet influences contributed appreciably to 
violations after 1917. The legislature's eager 
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment 
reflected in part the conviction that a dry 
nation was needed to make Kansas genuinely 
dry. Upset that a truly dry Kansas did not 
materialize during national Prohibition, a new 
generation of governors readily found new 
explanations for wetness. Like the earlier 
progressive governors, they usually did so 
without serious examination of their own 
position. 
The progressive governors' habitual claim 
that Kansas was the driest state, though 
excessive, was not totally without foundation. 
A large portion of the Kansas population did 
not drink and lived in nearly dry communities. 
Drys, however, either misunderstood or 
misrepresented the relationship between legal 
compulsion and Kansas abstemiousness. Many 
Kansans eschewed liquor because of personal 
belief, not because of the legal proscription. 
The real test of prohibition occurred where it 
clashed with a population that did not oppose 
drinking, and it was less than a resounding 
success. Prohibition was naturally the hardest 
to enforce in exactly the spots where the 
governors concentrated their efforts. Enforce-
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ment campaigns and growing dry sentiment 
may have lessened violations, but Kansas was 
not bone-dry on the eve of national Prohibi-
tion. 
Kansas governors from Hoch through 
Capper subscribed to prohibition on the 
progressive grounds that it would raise the 
moral standards of society and ensure the 
advance of humanity, but prohibition was not 
the only progressive reform that undermined 
the principles on which it was based. The 
excesses and hypocrisy of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, not its idealism, have heen 
ingrained in American consciousness, a result 
that could have been predicted, had the 
Kansas governors realistically appraised their 
experience. Perhaps the country would have 
forgiven the dismal aspects of Prohibition had 
it delivered what it promised. Kansas provided 
a case in point that absolute prohibition was 
unattainable. 
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